Regulatory Reform and Corporate Control in European Energy Industries by García, John J. & Trillas, Francesc
REGULATORY REFORM AND CORPORATE CONTROL IN EUROPEAN ENERGY  
INDUSTRIES 
 
John Jairo García  
Francesc Trillas 
 
No. 12‐14 
2012 
 1
 
Abstract-- The deregulation process in the EU electricity 
sector triggered strategic decisions that led to industry 
restructuring. This paper presents preliminary evidence of the 
impact of this process on investors, using event studies and 
estimation techniques such as least squares and GARCH. Our 
findings suggest three stylized facts: 1) regulatory reform in 
Europe was certainly accompanied by a takeover wave, as 
predicted by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996); 2) mergers and 
acquisitions had a positive impact on the stock price of target 
firms, and a much lower and sometimes even a negative impact 
for the bidding firms; 3) the effect of takeover announcements on 
the returns of competitors of the merging firms depends on the 
degree of market power. In countries with high market power 
(like Spain) competitors significantly increase share returns upon 
takeover announcements, whereas in countries with lower 
market power (like England and Wales) returns do not change 
significantly. 
 
Index Terms- Companies, Electricity supply industry 
deregulation, Oligopoly, Stock Market. 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
his paper presents a preliminary investigation of the 
impact of regulatory reform in the European energy 
markets on the market for corporate control. Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996) found that factors such as changes in 
regulatory governmental policies had an important effect on 
the takeover wave in the financial, transport, and energy 
sectors of the USA in the 1980s and 1990s. Similarly, as we 
document below, energy firms undertook actions in the market 
for corporate control to adapt to the regulatory changes 
(liberalization, deregulation, regulatory reform, privatization) 
that took place in Europe starting in the last decades of the 
twentieth century. More specifically, these changes have 
triggered an unprecedented wave of mergers and acquisitions, 
many of them through takeovers. However, there is very little 
work on the relationship between regulatory changes and 
corporate control activity. In particular, an exercise that has 
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become standard for other industries (to compute through 
event studies the impact of corporate changes on shareholder 
value and extract economic implications from it) has not been 
extensively applied to European energy firms (see Trillas, 
2001, for a very limited exception). This paper is a first 
attempt to fill this gap. 
 We provide information on the coincidence in time of 
regulatory reform and very significant changes in corporate 
ownership, and we quantify the impact of some corporate 
control events on transacting companies’ stock returns 
through a range of estimation techniques, such as least 
squares, GARCH and SURE. We obtain three important 
results: 1) The European energy sectors have experienced a 
wave of mergers and acquisitions, which has been 
contemporaneous to the regulatory reform process. 2) There 
are statistically significant positive abnormal returns for target 
firms and weakly significant negative returns for the bidding 
firms; and 3) Takeovers have a positive effect on the value of 
competitors in a market characterized by high market power 
(Spain), and non-significantly different from zero effect on the 
value of competitors in a market characterized by low market 
power (England and Wales).   
Significant changes in public policies or technology, 
supply and demand shocks, trigger changes in industry 
structure. European energy firms are a case in point; they do 
not stay as spectators of regulatory reform, but try to position 
themselves to face the new challenges. These actions take 
place in many instances through the market for corporate 
control. Event studies quantify the impact of hese actions on 
shareholder value, and this may provide a test for a variety of 
economic hypotheses. The methodology is based on 
measuring the reaction of shareholders’ expectations in front 
of new information and, therefore, the expected effect on the 
firm’s discounted value (see Fama et al., 1969; Binder, 1998; 
Campbell et al., 1997; and Khotari and Warner, 2006). A 
merger for example may create value for shareholders, 
through efficiencies caused by scale or scope economies, 
vertical integration, or through increased market power. This 
paper uses OLS and GARCH estimation techniques to analize 
the impact of changes in the corporate control of the main 
European energy firms on their value, as measured through 
stock prices. Especifically, we first analyze target behavior 
through the impact of takeovers launched on Endesa, 
Hidrocantábrico, Scottish Power and Unión Fenosa. Next we 
look at the effect of takeovers on the returns of competing 
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firms.1 And finally, we quantify the impact of mergers and 
acquisitions for eleven of the most important energy firms in 
Europe: E.ON, RWE, Endesa, Gas Natural, Iberdrola, Unión 
Fenosa, ENEL, ENI, Energías de Portugal, Suez and 
Vattenfall.  
After this introduction, we present some hypotheses and 
explain the methodology and data that will be used to test 
them. Finally, we show the quantitative results in terms of the 
impact of corporate changes on the value of firms, and finally 
we conclude.  
II.  HYPOTHESES, METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
A.  Hypotheses 
Any expansion of firms raises questions about its 
impact on shareholder wealth. Event studies provide evidence 
of such impact, by measuring the abnormal returns associated 
to unanticipated events. To the extent that financial markets 
are efficient, event studies provide evidence on the impact of 
the announcements on the firm’s stream of profits and, 
therefore, its discounted value. A merger can create value for 
shareholders if there are efficiency synergies (scope or scale 
economies, vertical integration) or if the merger increases 
market power.2 This usually translates into positive abnormal 
returns for target firms’ shareholders, while stock prices of 
bidding firms may not significantly change. The literature 
explains this as a free-rider problem : shareholders only sell 
their shares if the bidding price equals the expected price of 
the shares after the takeover. Then any improvement in the 
value of the firm triggered by the change in management is 
captured by the shareholders of the target firm. It could also 
happen that value is destroyed as a result of the merger, if the 
bidding firm overpays for the target. This may be a signal that 
mergers are carried out for reasons that are unrelated to 
shareholder wealth. For example, the optimal size of the firm 
for managers may be larger than the optimal size from the 
point of view of the value of the firm (empire building).  
We are interested in looking at empirical evidence through the 
lens of two hypotheses :  
 
Hypothesis 1:  
The value of target firms in the energy sector increases when a 
takeover is announced. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  
The effect of the announcement of a takeover on the value of 
competitiors depends on the existence of market power. If 
market power is high, competing firms experience statistically 
significant positive abnormal returns.  
 
A merger becomes an opportunity for the buying firm 
given the possibility of value creation, despite the costs of the 
                                                          
1 For example, for the three takeovers that had Endesa as target, we 
analyze their effect on the returns of Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa, which are 
Endesa’s competitors in the Spanish electricity market. 
2 Cox and Portes (1998). 
transaction. Value creation may result from exogenous 
changes in supply or demand that increase the profit 
maximizing firm size. Synergies may include more efficient 
management, or a better matching between management and 
physical assets. They may also include vertical efficiencies 
(through the elimination of double marginalization, through 
the internalization of externalities or through better incentives 
for sunk investments), or the combination of complementary 
resources. Finally, a higher value of the firm may be due to 
increased unilateral or multilateral market power that derives 
from a lower number of firms (Eckbo, 1983).   
It could be that improvements in social efficiency 
derived from a merger can be sufficiently high to compensate 
for the loss of welfare from collusion, if this exists. But if a 
merger increases the chances of collusion, it should be 
welcomed by shareholders of competing firms. The effect of a 
takeover or a merger announcement on non-merging 
competitors, however, is a topic that has been less explored 
from an empirical point of view. Eckbo (1983) argues that the 
sign of the expected effect on rivals is unclear. Abnormal 
returns could be positive, because the number of firms in the 
industry diminishes, and this increases unilateral (for example, 
in a Cournot model) and multilateral market power (in more 
general repeated oligopoly models), which also benefits the 
rivals of merging firms. But abnormal returns for rivals could 
also be negative, if they anticipate that the merging firms will 
be more efficient and therefore more competitive, hindering 
the profitability of their rivals. Consistent with the first 
possibility, Duso et al. (2006) find, for a sample of mergers 
and acquisitions that were analyzed by the European 
Commission, statistically significant positive abnormal returns 
for the competitors of the merging firms.   
 
B.  Methodology 
Event study techniques have been used to evaluate 
corporate events and the effect of regulatory changes in 
different industries. Hypotheses that make some prediction for 
firms’ profits can be tested with these widely and increasingly 
used techniques. A crucial assumption of event studies is that 
all publicly available information is incorporated in stock 
prices, that is, the semi-strong version of the efficient market 
hypothesis holds. This is not the place to discuss this 
hypothesis, but it is a salutary caveat to remark that many of 
the economic implications of event studies hold to the extent 
that this hypothesis is valid. 
The most widespread model used to predict normal 
returns of firm j in period t is the market model. Then real 
returns are compared to these normal returns to obtain a 
measure of abnormal returns (Campbell et al., 1997, and Fama 
et al., 1969). 
 
tjtmjjtj RR ,,,          (1) 
 with 0)( , tjE   and  jtjVar  2, )(   
 
 3
where jtR  are the returns of firm j  in period t , mtR  are the 
returns of a portfolio of firms representing the stock market 
(we use Eurofirst 300), j and j  are parameters and  jt  is 
an error term. To this model, one can add a dummy variable: 
 
tjtjjtmjjtj DRR ,,,,        
 (2) 
 
Where j  captures the abnormal return of action j in the date 
of event t, directly estimated in the regression. One can group 
sets of actions to compute average abnormal returns, for 
examples for takeover events of a same firm or group of firms. 
With several firms, it iwould be possible to obtain extra 
information by using a system of equations (Binder, 1985):  
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where n ...1 are the error terms for the n firms. These terms 
can be heteroskedastic across firms, but not correlated over 
time. It is also possible to introduce restrictions over 
coefficients, such as equality of betas, which can be tested 
through maximum likelihood or Wald tests.  
 
As argued by Savickas (2003), an appropriate approach used 
to estimate the volatility of the conditional process of the 
variance, can be represented as follows: 
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 (4) 
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where tjh , is the conditional variance of the time variation and 
jjjj dcba ,,,  are the coefficients of the GARCH (1,1) 
specification; tjD ,  dummy variable equal to 1 for the date of 
the event for firm j and 0 otherwise. j  captures the 
coefficient of the abnormal returns on the date of the 
announcement. The conditional variance tjh ,  provides a 
natural estimator of the variance of the abnormal returns. 
 
The GARCH approach explicitly models the volatility of the 
returns and the possible increase of the variance that takes 
place when there are unforeseen events. In the estimation 
through a traditional approach such as OLS, there is a higher 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when this is not 
false (Savickas, 2003). 
 
C.  Data 
The events concerning takeovers, mergers and 
acquisitions for each of the firms were selected from the data 
bases LEXIS-NEXIS and OSIRIS. The criterion that was used 
for their selection was that they had the characteristic of a 
“surprise” event, that is, not anticipated by the market.   
The historical series of daily stocks and indices was 
obtained from Yahoo Finance3 and in some cases directly 
through the firms (as in the case of the historical series of 
Hidrocantábrico stock prices; Hidrocantábrico ceased to be 
traded as an independent stock when it was acquired by 
Electricidade de Portugal). The European indices used in the 
estimations is Eurofirst 300.  
Daily returns are computed using a logarithmic 
transformation:  
  )ln()ln( 1 ttt pPR      (7) 
where )ln( 1 tt rR  exhibits results that are practically 
identical to a growth rate, with a distribution that is more 
symmetric and that is more convenient for the transformation 
of the series.  
 
III.  IMPACT OF CORPORATE CHANGE ON THE VALUE OF THE 
MAIN EUROPEAN ENERGY FIRMS   
A.  The Market for Corporate Control in the Energy Sector 
Europe has seen an unprecedented crossborder mergers and 
acquisitions wave in the energy sectors at the beginning of the 
XXI century.  This seems to have been in preparation or as a 
reaction to regulatory reform in the industry. If companies 
cannot influence market rules, they may try to influence 
industry structure. We present in this subsection some case 
studies that show how takeovers in energy sectors are 
protracted and how the setting is such that the shareholders of 
the target firms stand to gain much more than the shareholders 
of bidding firms. 
 
The Endesa Takeover Battle 
In September 2005 the Spanish firm Gas Natural made an 
offer for Endesa that triggered a bitter economic and political 
debate, because a company based in Barcelona (the second 
largest city in the country) was trying to take over a company 
based in the capital Madrid. The management team of Endesa 
defended its position using political and economic strategies. 
In 2006, an offer by E.On improved upon the one by Gas 
Natural, although it was also initially rejected by the 
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management team, and triggered a reaction by the Spanish 
government trying to stop a surprise acquisition of control by 
foreign interests. This reaction included a discretional change 
in the rules of the elecricity regulatory agency that allowed 
this agency to stop a merger appealing to reasons of security 
of supply or national interest. In 2007, the battle finished with 
an Italian company, ENEL, which had the Italian state as the 
main shareholder, gaining control of the compay in 
partnership with a Spanish construction firm, apparently with 
the agreement of the Spanish government. 
Spanish electricity firms (and especially Endesa) had been 
among the protagonists of a remarkable expansion process 
characterized by investments in Latin America, investments or 
alliances in the rest of Europe, and diversification in the 
telecommunications and other industries. The largest in 
magnitude have been the acquisitions in Latin America.  
The expansion of Endesa in Latin America, like that of 
Telefónica, the Spanish incumbent telecommunications 
operator, started and gathered momentum when the largest 
shareholder of the company was the state, prior to the full 
privatization of the firm. The global result of the expansion in 
Latin America was neutral for Endesa’s shareholders, 
according to the event study technique, although the impact of 
the largest acquisition, the takeover of Chilean firm Enersis, 
was negative according to two studies mentioned below. 
Endesa also expanded in telecommunications (Retevisión, 
Amena, Menta, later integrated under the company name 
Auna), although it has recently abandoned this industry after 
the sale of Auna to Ono and France Telecom.4 Both in 
Telefónica and in Endesa there are reasons to believe that the 
main corporate control mechanisms did not work 
appropriately. There were no shareholders with a controlling 
stake, there was no credible takeover threat at the time (either 
because of public ownership at the early stages of the 
expansions, or because of the government’s threat to use the 
golden share), and product market and managerial labor 
market competition were scarce.  The only factors that 
provided external discipline to managers were the fact that the 
companies’ stock was quoted in international markets and the 
presence of institutional shareholders, as well as the slow and 
progressive introduction of product market competition 
(especially in mobile telephony in telecommunications and in 
the generation segment in electricity). The takeover of 
Enersis, the largest privatized electricity firm in Chile, in the 
late 1990s, took longer and was more costly than expected, 
and with a negative effect on (both bidder and target) 
shareholder wealth. It is not clear either that Chilean 
consumers were better off with the takeover. On the one hand, 
                                                          
4 Unión Fenosa is also a Spanish electricity firm with significant 
investments outside the energy sectors, for example in the Airports sector in 
Mexico, or in the engineering sector with subsidiary Soluziona. Although 
diversification ouside the energy sectors have been punished by investors, the 
participation of the same firm both in electricity and gas markets is broadly 
accepted as a value-creating development, due to productive efficiency gains 
obtained through mainly vertical integration in the provision of gas as an input 
in electricity generation, and also to joint offers in the retail supply of gas and 
electricity. 
the takeover put pressure on the Chilean regulator to improve 
competition conditions in electricity, by triggering a debate on 
vertical integration. But Endesa won the takeover battle by 
defeating an offer by the American firm Duke Energy, which 
was less willing to pay the high cost of a protracted and 
politicized battle, but it may well have had a better business 
plan for consumers.  
Precise quantitative evidence on the effects of Spanish 
firms’ expansion comes from event studies, which provide a 
measurement of the impact of particular events on 
shareholders’ expectations (and, therefore, to the extent that 
financial markets are efficient, a quantification of the expected 
effect on the firm’s discounted value). Trillas (2001) 
concentrates on the Endesa case, with especial attention on the 
Enersis takeover. This study reveals a negative and significant 
impact on their own shareholders and on the minority 
shareholders of the target firm in the largest acquisition of 
Endesa in Latin America. However, existing event studies, 
either they present a too general picture, or a too narrow one, 
without presenting as yet a quantification of the effect on 
shareholders of all corporate control transactions in the overall 
electricity industry. The fact that the largest firms have been 
acquirers makes it likely that the global result will most 
probably not be a net gain for shareholders (given that the 
bidder shareholders usually obtain worse results than target 
shareholders), but the exact quantitative exercise remains to be 
done, and will probably and reasonably have to wait until the 
takeover wave ends. The increasing takeover threat on these 
large firms can more recently be a discipline mechanism for 
managers, who possibly will be in a learning process on how 
to better measure investment risks.  
After the Gas Natural takeover, E.On showed interest in 
Endesa. E.On is the result of the merger of two large 
electricity firms in Germany in the late 90s, Veba and Viag. 
The resulting firm very soon engaged in a number of 
international acquisitions, such as Sydkraft in Sweden and 
Powergen in the United Kingdom, and merged with the 
dominant German gas operator, Ruhrgas.  In early 2006, E.On 
announced its last big acquisition, a takeover over Spanish 
Endesa, competing with a previous takeover launched by the 
Spanish gas firm Gas Natural. E.On thus followed the pattern 
of first creating a strong national firm and next expanding 
internationally. 
The Powergen and Endesa acquisitions were presented 
both as friendly or “white knight” acquisitions. Powergen and 
Endesa also have in common that they were both the result of 
privatization and had been diversifying in other industries and 
geographically -Powergen in the US and Endesa in Latin 
America.  
The example of E.On is often shown to illustrate a trend 
towards vertically integrated global utilities focused both on 
gas and electricity, but abandoning investments in other 
industries such as telecommunications. The only significant 
effect of the main E.On acquisition announcements in the 
recent past is a positive abnormal return at the time of the 
Ruhrgas merger announcement. The announcement of the 
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acquisitions of Powergen and Endesa did not have a 
significantly different from zero effect on shareholder value, 
although the sign of the abnormal return in the Endesa case is 
positive. This is consistent with the theoretical and empirical 
research on takeovers, which expects that shareholder gains 
are captured by the target firm shareholders. In contrast with 
the acquisition of Enersis by Endesa, however, at least the 
acquiring shareholders do not expect to lose from these 
acquisitions. Since 2000 the stock market behavior of E.On 
had been much better than that of Endesa. One may thus 
conclude, first, that expanding firms can show very different 
performance in the stock market depending on the details of 
expansion, and that firms with expanding strategies that are 
not welcomed by shareholders (bad bidders), risk being taken 
over by even stronger rivals (that is, they risk becoming good 
targets). 
Since E.ON stepped in at the end of February 2006 with a 
bigger and better offer than that of Gas Natural, the 
government manoeuvred to frustrate it. E.ON was offering 
€29.1 billion ($34.7 billion) for Endesa—the biggest takeover 
bid in the history of the utilities industry—compared with Gas 
Natural's €22.5 billion cash-and-stock offer. After its own 
antitrust authority and the EU approved E.ON's proposal in 
April, the government's obstructionism intensified. Eager to 
thwart the deal, the government invested special powers in 
CNE, which is Spain's energy regulator and is controlled by a 
board that is close to the government. At the end of July 2006 
the CNE imposed 19 conditions on E.ON's bid for Endesa, 
such as a commitment to invest in gas-transmission networks 
and an obligation to keep Endesa properly capitalised. Three 
of the CNE's demands were very controversial. First, E.ON 
would have to sell the only nuclear-power plant wholly owned 
by Endesa. Next, it would also have to sell all of Endesa's 
coal-powered plants, because Spanish coal is subsidised and 
the government is worried that the Germans would use 
cheaper imports. Third, Endesa's operations on the Balearic 
and Canary Islands, and in northern Africa, must be divested.  
The corporate control of Endesa was quite contested: four 
firms were involved in the competition for the prize, two 
Spanish firms (one from the gas sector, Gas Natural; and 
another from the construction sector, Acciona); a German one, 
E.On; and an Italian one, Enel. After a takeover battle of more 
than two years, the end seemed to be near when on 1st 
Octubre 2007 ENEL and Acciona announced that they were in 
posesión of 92.06% of the shares. However, it was not until 
February 2009 that ENEL obtained full ownership of Endesa, 
after a series of discrepancies with Acciona. The control battle 
that had started on September 5th 2005 finished almost two 
and a half years later.  
On July 4th 2007, the Spanish energy regulatory agency 
CNE approved, under twelve conditions, the takeover 
launched by ENEL and Acciona. The next day, the takeover 
was also approved by the European Commission. Between 
August 2005 (one month prior to the first takeover by Gas 
Natural) until October 2007 (when ENEL and Acciona 
effectively acquired 92.06% of Endesa), the value of the 
shares of Endesa increased in 119%5.  
 
Using the GARCH methodology suggested by Savickas 
(2003), the average abnormal returns for Endesa shareholders 
of events related to the takeover battle were 4.16%. The OLS 
results are 2.72%. This is consistent with our hypothesis that 
target firm shareholders are winners in takeover battles. 
 
 
The Hidrocantábrico Takeover Battle 
In 2000, EnBW, a German subsidiary of the state owned 
French firm EDF, announced a takeover of Hidrocantábrico, 
the fourth largest electricity firm in Spain, which has most of 
its assets in the northern region of Asturias. The Spanish 
government reacted passing a law forbidding any foreign 
state-owned firm from controlling an electricity company. 
This law would be subsequently rejected by the European 
institutions. The Asturias regional government was more open 
to bargaining, and since the beginning showed a 
predisposition to lobby for the takeover in exchange for 
industrial and employment concessions. The takeover battle 
triggered by the initial EDF offer ended four years later, in 
2004, when the state-owned Electricidade de Portugal (EDP), 
in partnership with a regional savings bank, Cajastur, made a 
final winning offer that was accepted by the shareholders of 
Hidrocantábrico, committing the firm to keep its headquarters 
in Asturias and develop a number of industrial development 
and employment programs. 
The case of the ownership and control change in 
Hidrocantábrico illustrates some of the more interesting 
aspects in the corporate control market in Spain, namely the 
role of the different levels of government (European, Spanish, 
regional), the saving banks, the state owned firms and target 
firm managers. Hidrocantábrico unsuccessfully opted to buy 
Viesgo when Endesa put it up for sale. Besides, the takeovers 
of Unión Fenosa and Ferroatlántica-EnBW implied the 
withdrawal of other takeovers that had been launched, 
respectively, by the US firm Texas Utilities and the German 
firm RWE. Furthermore, the Spanish government lifted the 
veto on the political rights of foreign state owned firms in 
Hidrocantábrico in September 2003 after receiving a warning 
from the European Commission.  
Hidrocantábrico was the target of five takeovers in 2000 
and 2001, those launched by Texas Utilities, Unión FENOSA, 
Ferroatlántica-EnBW, RWE and Cajastur-EDP. That is, one 
US firm, two German firms (one of them with the state owned 
French firm EDF as the main shareholder), one Portuguese 
firm and one Spanish firm. The Belgian firm Electrabel also 
participated in the takeover contest as a minority shareholder. 
The winning takeover was that of Ferroatlántica-EnBW, 
although Cajastur and EDP stayed as minority shareholders. 
Eventually, EDP acquired, in a direct transaction in 2004, a 
share package from the rest of shareholders to reach 95% of 
                                                          
5 Between October 2003 and October 2005 there were 20 takeovers in 
Spain with an average premium for minoritary shareholders of target firms of 
20.3% over the share prices the day before the takeover was announced.  
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the stock, in such a way that Hidrocantábrico became a 
subsidiary of EDP, with a Chairman proposed by the minority 
local shareholder, saving bank Cajastur. The successful 
foreign companies, first EnBW and next EDP, participated in 
the contest in alliance with local investors, with the goal of 
overcoming political resistance associated to the loss of 
control by national shareholders.  
The control contest for Hidrocantábrico, the fourth largest 
Spanish electricity firm, lasted more than one year between 
2000 and 2001, and it did not end in practice until 2004 with 
the assumption of total control by EDP.   
One of the interesting issues in this takeover battle was that 
the regional government from Asturias (one of the Spanish 
Autonomous Communities in the North of Spain, where the 
company headquarters and most of its assets are located) and 
the then incumbent management team called for the takeover 
battle to take place, setting as condition that the firm kept its 
headquarters in Asturias and that the ownership change was 
compatible with maintaining industrial and employment 
objectives in the region. The Asturias regional government 
went to the extreme of criticizing the Spanish government 
over the takeover battle, because the Spanish central 
government was against the presence of firms controlled by 
foreign state-owned capital, while the Asturias government 
was willing to accept such presence if it made possible to have 
a strong subsidiary with its headquarters in Asturias, and 
willing to cooperate in industrial and employment objectives. 
This illustrates that not all governments support national or 
regional champions in the same way. With the outcome of the 
battle, economic and social agents in Asturias managed to 
make compatible strong gains for shareholders; the entry of a 
strong firm with the ambition to be a key player in the 
forthcoming (although several times postponed) Iberian 
Electricity Market together with the largest Spanish electricity 
firms, implying consumer gains from product market 
competition and improved productive efficiency; and the 
guarantee that the new owners would cooperate with 
“strategic” objectives of industrial and employment policy, as 
interpreted by the Asturias regional government.  
Between the starting point of the takeover battle and the 
approval of the final bid by the European Commission in 
March 2002, the share prices of Hidrocantábrico increased by 
120%. 
Using the GARCH methodology, the average abnormal 
returns for Hidrocantábrico shareholders of events related to 
the takeover battle were 3.1%. The OLS results are 1.7%. This 
is again consistent with our hypothesis that target firm 
shareholders are winners in takeover battles.  
 
Merger between Iberdrola and Scottish Power 
The process of the acquisition of Scottish Power by 
Iberdrola only lasted five months. Iberdrola announced its 
interest in the Scottish firm on November 8th, 2006, and the 
courts in Edimburgh resolved the last barriers for the 
integration of both firms on  23 de April, 23d, 2007. A 
plausible explanation of this is that market power in the 
British energy market is not high. This is one of the few 
energy markets in Europe where concentration levels are 
relatively low.6 This was ratified by the European 
Commission when it approved the transaction without 
conditions on February 15th, 2007. On March 2nd of the same 
year, the parties obtained the last regulatory approval by the 
Public Utilities Commission of the State of New York in the 
US, which was needed given that both merging firms had 
assets in the American market. 
The surprise announcement of the acquisition on 
November 8th 2006 was associated to a 3% abnormal return, 
computed both with the GARCH and OLS methodologies. If 
we compute the impact on shareholders between one month 
before the takeover, October 2006, and April 2007, when the 
acquisition is finally authorized, the share price increased in 
20%.  
Compared with the much higher increase of the value of 
Endesa and Hidrocantábrico during their takeover battles, in 
this case the value increase is substantially lower. One 
possible explanation is that these Spanish firms operated in a 
context of higher market power, with larger rents to be 
captured from reducing the number of firms. Campa and 
Hernando (2004) find that the announcements of mergers and 
acquisitions for firms in industries that had previously been 
under strong regulatory controls, obtain comparatively lower 
abnormal returns than when regulatory controls are less strict.  
 
Merger between Gas Natural and Unión Fenosa 
After the failed attempt to take over Endesa in 2005, Gas 
Natural acquired Unión Fenosa in 2009. The day that the 
acquisition was announced, the shares of the acquired firm 
experienced abnormal returns, -4.1% with the GARCH model 
and -4% with OLS. The Credit Rating Agency Fitch stated 
that there were likely negative implications of the debt 
increase in Gas Natural as a result of the operation (Reuters 
31-07-2008). The transaction took place in two stages. In the 
first, the gas company, after the approval by the Spanish 
regulatory agency CNE, bought 9.99% of the shares on 
August 17th, 2008, and on February 26th, 2009, it bought the 
remaining 35.32%.  With this purchase, it obtained 50.02% of 
the shares in the company, since it had a minority stake prior 
to the first stage. The second stage required launching a 
takeover for the rest of the shares, in a process that concluded 
on April 2009, after the stock exchange regulator, CNMV, 
authorized the takeover on March 18th, 2009. The share price 
of the acquired firms, between the announcement of the 
acquisition until the final authorization by the CNMV, 
increased in 42% (see Graph 4).  
The facts in corporate control market for Spanish electricity 
firms in the last decade are consistent with some of the 
predictions derived from academic research:  
-Liberalization has triggered a mergers and acquisitions 
                                                          
6 For example the HHI for the UK after 1999 has been below 1000 points 
(Mattes et al., 2005). The thresholds established by the US and the EU define 
a market as highly concentrated at 1800 and 2000 respectively. A market with 
a HHI below 1000 is defined as non-concentrated.  
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wave, to the extent of involving all the firms in the industry, 
and has caused an increase in shareholder concentration.  
-Takeovers in an industry where regulation still play an 
important role are protracted, not always successful and have 
a (sometimes too) high cost for shareholders in acquiring 
firms.  
-Politicization of the control market in this industry shows 
in the background of some managers and in the reasons by 
which some takeovers find obstacles or are the object of 
heated debates with little economic or financial content. The 
activism of a variety of interest groups (such as managers, 
shareholders, local and regional communities) confirms that 
collusion between policy makers and lobbies is an important 
fact in this kind of industries, and that the conduct of 
regulatory institutions is seriously affected by its presence.  
-Resistance to ownership changes reveals the importance 
that society, as mediated by its political agents, allocates to the 
control of firms. The specificity and long lived nature of 
investments still attract, in spite of liberalization, owners that 
are different from the profile of other capitalist private 
owners, especially state-owned firms and saving banks (which 
in Spain have a nature close to that of non profit mutual 
firms). Liberalization  (wich only happens in some segments 
of the value chain) does not fundamentally alter the fact that 
long lived specific investments are still subject to a high 
regulatory, technology and market risk. The Spanish 
government stopped mergers between Spanish energy firms 
(Fenosa-Hidrocantábrico, Hidrocantábrico-Viesgo, Endesa-
Iberdrola) consistently with the goal of not increasing national 
levels of industry structure concentration after the expansion 
of Endesa prior to its full privatization in the late 90s, but did 
not take advantage of the takeovers (for example through the 
imposition of conditions) or of the privatization of Endesa to 
achieve a less concentrated industry structure.  
 
Effects of the takeovers on competitors’ returns  
We also studied the effect that the Endesa and 
Hidrocantábrico takeover announcements had on their closest 
competitors in the Spanish electricity pool. In all cases, 
competitors experience statistically significant positive 
abnormal returns. For example, on occasion of the Endesa 
takeovers, competitors Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa 
experienced abnormal returns of 2.1% and 1%, respectively 
(both with GARCH and OLS). On occasion of the 
Hidrocantábrico takeovers, competitors Endesa, Iberdrola and 
Unión Fenosa experience on average abnormal returns of  
1.7%, 1.4% and 0.9%, using GARCH, and 1.2%, 1.5% and 
0.4%, using OLS. Unión Fenosa’s abnormal returns when the 
Hidrocantábrico takeovers are announced are not statistically 
significant, but this was at the time a small competitor. 
Overall, the results suggest that increased concentration 
derives into higher market power for all the firms in the 
market, along the lines of Eckbo (1983) and Aktas et al. 
(2006).  
On occasion of the takeover of Scottish Power by 
Iberdrola, in contrast, Brittish competitors Centrica and 
National Power experience non-significant positive abnormal 
returns of 0.9% and 0.4%, respectively, both with models 
GARCH and OLS. A possible explanation is that the Brittish 
market was characterized by a lower level of market power 
than the Spanish electricity market. Whereas the Herfindahl-
Hirschman (HHI) index in the early years of the XXI Century 
was below 1000 in the UK, it was between 1500 and 1800 in 
Spain (Matthes et al., 2005). As explained by Duso et al. 
(2006) a positive reaction by competitors could be explained 
by the takeovers revealing information about potential 
efficiency gains in the industry as a whole. However, the fact 
that competitors react differently in markets with different 
degrees of concentration, suggests that market power is a 
more plausible explanation.   
 
 
 
B.  Mergers and Acquisitions of European Energy Firms 
between 2000 and 2007 
In this sub-section, we analyze the impact of 40 events7 
related to mergers and acquisitions by 11 of the most 
important energy firms in Europe. The abnormal returns of 
these firms’ shares for these events are computed using OLS 
and  GARCH. These 11 firms are: two German (RWE and 
E.ON), two Italiandos (ENI and ENEL), one French (Suez), 
four Spanish (Endesa, Gas Natural, Iberdrola and Unión 
Fenosa), one Swedish (Vattenfall) and one Portuguese (EDP). 
These firms were quoted in the stock markets between 2001 
and 2007. We collected surprise mergers and acquisitions 
events for these companies using databases  LEXIS-NEXIS 
and OSIRIS, between July 10th 2001 and May 31st, 2007.  
GARCH and OLS individual regressions for each firm  
show two results:8 
The firms that were mostly involved in selling transactions 
(Endesa and Iberdrola) experience statistically significant 
positive abnormal returns at the 1% level with both methods. 
For Endesa these returns are 3.7% using GARCH and 2.7% 
using OLS; while for Iberdrola they are 1.5% and 1.2% 
respectively.  
The firms that were mostly involved in buying transactions 
mostly experience statistically significant negative abnormal 
returns. Only three of them experienced the opposite sign: 
Suez and EDP both with GARCH and OLS, and E.ON only 
with GARCH. 
IV.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS: COMPETITION POLICY, 
NATIONAL CHAMPIONS AND CORPORATE CONTROL 
Case studies and econometric evidence presented in this 
paper, based on the experience of European countries, suggest 
                                                          
7 As in the previous section, three observations are taken into account for 
every event: the day before, the anouncement day, and the day after the 
announcement.  
8 These results are qualitatively the same using pooled OLS and SURE 
regressions for all firms, but the tests reveal that the system of equations does 
not significantly improve in efficiency relative to the individual firm 
regressions (see García-Rendón, 2010). 
 8
that takeovers in the energy sectors i) tend to coincide with 
regulatory reform; ii) are very costly for buying firms; iii) 
generate significant gains for target shareholders; and iv) 
depend on the degree of (product) market power in terms of 
the impact on competitors and the shareholders gains to be 
made in the market for corporate control. 
An interesting feature of the takeovers of Hidrocantábrico 
and Endesa examined above is that the regulatory game 
conditioned the nature and identity of the firms that eventually 
resulted from the takeover battles. In Hidrocantábrico, 
eventually the winning bidder was Electricidade de Portugal 
in coalition with a regional savings bank (Cajastur) partially 
controlled by the Asturias regional government. In the Endesa 
takeovers some years later, Enel of Italy, with the Italian state 
as the largest bidder, won the contest against E.On after 
forming a coalition with the Spanish construction company 
Acciona. As the examples suggest, there is a risk that a 
disproportionate amount of Type I errors will occur: some 
good mergers will not be authorized. There is then a trade off 
between the different expertise of several regulators. Wolak 
(2007) argues that "few mergers involving generation unit 
owners in wholesale electricity markets will be able to survive 
this multi-stage, federal and state antitrust and regulatory 
approval process and still provide value to the shareholders of 
the merged companies. The public benefit standard applied by 
most public utility commissions provides state governments 
with a substantial ability to extract financial concessions from 
the merging parties that may cause the merging parties to 
terminate potentially beneficial mergers." This raises the risk 
not only of efficient mergers not happening, but also of 
inefficient firms winning in some takeover battles: if winning 
takeover battles is costly and protracted, it will not be the 
firms that are best at producing electricity that win, but rather 
the best at playing the political game, or the ones able and 
willing to foot the bill of these protracted processes, such as 
firms with bad governance or public ownership. 
A merger or acquisition (especially if it takes the form of a 
takeover) changes the objective function of policy makers 
because more light is projected into the industry, consumers 
and other stakeholders mobilize and this has a well 
documented impact on the potential (lower) wealth gains to be 
extracted from the transaction. The existing literature shows 
that mergers in regulated industries take longer to be 
completed and show a lower takeover success ratio than in 
other industries; there is also clear evidence that deregulation 
is ususally accompanied by a takeover wave. There is a small 
literature on the optimal allocation of merger authority in the 
vertical chain of government (see Trillas, 2009). This 
literature focuses on the role of jurisdictional externalities in 
terms of the effect of a merger on the surplus that is captured 
by foreign consumers and the impact on foreign competitors, 
in a framework where a merger authority maximizes some 
combination of the surplus of national consumers and 
producers. There is no formal work to my knowledge on the 
role of regulatory authorities or on how to judge a merger 
from the point of view of it making more or less difficult the 
role of regulators when there are jurisdictional externalities. 
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